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Abstract 
In our paper, we aim at pointing out the way the most relevant institutional actors 
currently define the security agenda for the Milanese metropolitan area, which kind of 
goals they try to pursue, upon which instruments and resources they can rely, which 
division of labour and forms of cooperation they try to putting into practices. We draw 
from an analyses of both official documents by the main public institutions involved in 
the governance of security in Milan and semi-structured interviews to all the members 
of the Comitato provinciale per l’ordine pubblico e la sicurezza – a board that gather 
the president of the province, the mayor of the province capital (plus mayors of other 
cities and towns of the province who can be involved on an ad hoc basis), the 
representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Prefetto), the District Attorney and the 
chiefs of all the national police forces – as well as to politicians, civil servants and 
commissioners of the local police of the city of Milan. We illustrate how discourses and 
practices of in/security have contributed to the construction of the city as place exposed 
to a multiplicity of risks that local authorities and police forces are expected to manage. 
Furthermore, we highlight how the diffusion and legitimization of an ‘ideology of safety’ 
has turned the demand to live in safe communities into an attempt to legitimize 
exclusionary practices insofar as discourses on security were strictly interconnected with 
discourses on cultural identity and, focusing on both the (imagined) community 
repertoire and the us/them opposition, ended up legitimizing a racialized urban 
governance of inclusion and exclusion. Finally, we try to show that a recent attempt, by 
the new centre-left government, to modify such an approach is generating ambiguous 
and controversial results and is paradoxically promoting an even stronger securitization 
of urban policies, spaces and life through more democratically oriented governmental 
practices. 
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Introduction 
In this paper we intend to illustrate the role that security issues have 
played in the last two decades with respect to the overall governance of 
the city of Milan. We want to show how the very possibility of 
imagining the governance of Milan depends, among other things, on a 
shared definition of what security is or should be. In addition, we will 
focus on how the main institutional actors currently shape the security 
agenda of Milan, looking at the type of goals they pursue and the 
normative provisions and resources they have, along with the division 
of labour and the forms of cooperation they seek to implement. Our 
study is based on original research conducted between 2013 and 2015, 
in which we examined the most relevant institutional documents 
produced on this issue by the main public actors, and carried out semi-
structured interviews (between November 2014 and May 2015) both 
with members of the Provincial Committee for Public Order and 
Security - which includes the president of the province, the mayor of 
the provincial capital (and other mayors convened ad hoc), the Chief of 
Police and the local heads of all police forces (Polizia, Carabinieri and 
Guardia di Finanza) - and with a number of officials and executives 
from Milan’s local police force. Special attention was paid to three main 
thematic areas: a) definitions of urban security; b) the main actors and 
their functions, competences and responsibilities; c) continuity and 
changes in the governance of urban security in the Milanese context. 
I. Securitization of urban governance  
Security has always been a major concern of governments and citizens 
in Western societies. From its origin, the modern state has prioritised 
the protection of citizen’s safety and their rights to individual property. 
The prioritisation of safety and private property are seen as a set of 
“goods” which Castel (2003) defines as “civil security”. During the 
20th Century, this primary form of protection was progressively 
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supplemented by a broader protective function, linked to the effective 
exercise of social rights through universal access to a set of goods and 
services essential for full participation in social life. Castel argues that 
it is precisely in this combination of civil security and social security 
that we saw the establishment of the pact between governors and 
citizens that characterised Western liberal-democracies in their so-
called trente glorieuses. 
This order progressively deteriorated during the 1980s – although in 
Italy only starting in the 1990s - to the extent that, even in those states 
that are still the safest on the planet (Garland 2001),1 the concern for the 
“civil” dimension of security gradually started to impose itself as a 
salient theme in public debate, alongside the growing erosion of social 
rights. In Italy in the nineties there was much social alarm around 
security issues and there was an increase in forms of citizen protest - 
sometimes spontaneous, much more often organized (Della Porta 2004) 
- in response to the “decay of neighborhoods”, the “spread of petty 
crime” and the presence of social groups (the homeless, irregular 
migrants, drug addicts, prostitutes, etc.) who were perceived to be 
dangerous (Maneri 2001). For at least two decades, the defense of 
neighbourhood decorum and the protection of the security of urban 
spaces have been the main reasons used to call for, and justify, the 
greater presence of police forces, the installation of devices to control 
public space (video surveillance), and the implementation of forms of 
situational prevention. All this is in the name of a local version of the 
North American brand of a ‘zero tolerance policy’ (De Giorgi 2000). 
Furthermore, the public debate on security was deeply shaped by the 
internal logic of the political framework and the relationship with the 
mass media, in a way largely independent of the emergence of 
                                                 
1 This process started well before concerns about the threats coming from 
international terrorist networks monopolised the attention of public opinion 
and the security apparatus. 
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“objective” risks. In fact, in the ‘90s and the 2000s, empirical evidence 
from crime statistics painted a highly controversial picture, calling into 
question any correlation between trends in crime rates and the centrality 
of the issue of insecurity within public debate (ISTAT 2008; European 
Security Observatory 2009). 
This discrepancy was so evident that a crucial distinction between real 
and perceived insecurity has rapidly emerged both in the political and 
in the scientific sphere, allowing a partial redefinition of the functions 
of various levels of government and identifying the local administration 
as the political-institutional actor that must take responsibility for 
citizens’ sense of insecurity (Barbagli, 1999). 
It is in such a climate that security has transformed from being “public” 
- i.e. the prerogative of central institutions and the exclusive domain of 
national police forces - to being “urbanized”, thus quickly becoming a 
central issue on the city government’s agenda under the rubric of “urban 
security”. Politicians and administrators begin to enhance their electoral 
credibility by making promises to do everything in their power, once 
elected, to “cleanse” urban spaces from all threats to citizens, and to 
base their government action on policies that openly tackle the issue of 
security in the city (Palidda 1997; 2000). 
The process of the recontextualization of security - which from being 
“public” has become “urban” - is therefore accompanied by a 
reconfiguration of urban policies through the widening of the range of 
risks - i.e. of morally unacceptable and/or criminal behaviour, and of 
subjects considered to be dangerous - which have to be addressed 
through security instruments. Grounding the definition of issues 
pertaining to city governance on the identification of specific threats, 
behaviours, situations or ethnic groups that supposedly represent a risk 
justifies the request for urgently implemented exceptional measures. 
These measures, when implemented through administrative acts such 
as ordinances against windscreen washers, commercial abuse, begging, 
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the sale of alcohol at night, or campaigns against illegal residential 
settlements, “Roma camps”, and so on, mark the complete 
securitization of the city’s public administration (Buzan, Waever and 
Wilde 1998). This is precisely how, during the 1990s and the 2000s, 
many crucial issues such as traffic, immigration, crime, the suburbs, 
freedom of religious expression, etc. were gradually brought into the 
semantic field of urban security (Procacci 2013; Marchetti and Molteni 
2013, 48).2  
A striking example of the “securitising” of a complex and delicate 
social issue can be seen in the policies of Milan’s centre-right city 
councils between 1993 and 2011 in response to a fundamental 
transformation of the urban fabric triggered by the growing presence of 
foreign citizens in the city. For more than fifteen years, the municipal 
administration, unlike in many other large European cities, had no 
policies aimed at fostering the socio-economic integration of migrants, 
the promotion of their languages and cultures of origin, intercultural 
dialogue or the economic valorisation of cultural diversity in the city 
(Caponio 2004). On the contrary, all efforts were concentrated on 
creating policies for the “protection of the citizenry” (or rather of 
Milan’s “native” residents and city users) from threats by certain social 
groups, among which migrants stood out (a group which Bauman 
described as foreigners ante portas3). The typical pattern, replicated in 
many areas of the city, was that the newcomers triggered in the old 
                                                 
2 These factors, grouped under the semantic umbrella of urban security, create, 
according to the mayors of Italian cities, great social alarm (Anci-Cittalia 
2012) and are often associated with the behaviour, or mere presence, of 
marginalised social groups: beggars, people with mental distress, prostitutes, 
squatters, drug and alcohol users and, in particular, nomads and migrants. 
Moreover, within this framework urban security, redefined in terms of 
legitimate needs and rights of the citizenry, has increasingly become a 
politically neutral issue, as summed up by the slogan: “Security is neither right-
wing nor left-wing” (Zedner 2009). 
3 See Bauman 1997. 
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residents the feeling of being an encircled minority. This feeling elicited 
defensive reactions, which led to the formation of neighbourhood 
committees against degradation and petty crime. Protests of organized 
residents, fuelled by “moral entrepreneurs”, the media and public 
administrators, legitimised an interpretation of the conflict over the use 
of public spaces as a non-negotiable opposition between “us” and 
“them” (Marzorati 2010; Quassoli 2004). Instead of mitigating 
widespread anxieties and fears by bringing them within the scope of 
“reasonableness”, politicians and administrators often gave in to these 
reactions, leading them to either adopt or call for security policies 
focused exclusively on the penal-repressive dimension (e.g. orders 
against multiple forms of anti-social behaviour, large-scale patrolling 
of public spaces, evictions of illegal settlements, etc.).4 
For example, between 2008 and 2009, eight ordinances were issued in 
relation to street prostitution, damage to public and private property, 
alcohol consumption and begging, as well as on the trade and use of 
drugs. In 2010, seven other ordinances were issued which regulated the 
opening hours of certain shops (kebab shops and phone centres) in 
certain areas because they were considered to be high-risk (via Padova, 
via Imbonati, and the Comasina and Corvetto areas).5 In the same years, 
“Operazione strade sicure” (Operation ‘Safe Streets’) was launched 
with the 2008 “Security Package” and is still ongoing. It led to the 
increase and intensification of patrols of the city - although with mixed 
results. This has led to the creation of mixed patrols composed of police 
                                                 
4 For a similar example related to a city administered by the centre-left, see 
Bellinvia 2013. 
5 For a very accurate reconstruction of the “season” of the ordinances, see 
Cittalia 2012; for an analysis of the relationship between organised 
citizens’protests and police practice, see Germain, Poletti 2007. For an 
analyses of the complexity, impasses and ambivalences concerning the use of 
ordinances as a governmental device, see. Cammarata and Monteleone 2013, 
Maggioni 2017. 
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officers and Italian military personnel. As far as illegal settlements are 
concerned, we need only recall how in February 2011 Riccardo De 
Corato, the councillor formerly responsible for security in the last 
centre-right administration, celebrated the 500th eviction carried out by 
the local police.6 
However, these interventions not only failed to address the causes of 
social hardship, but further fuelled it: on the one hand, they reinforced 
the perception that the city was actually unsafe, resulting in an increase, 
rather than a decrease, in a “feeling of insecurity”; on the other hand, 
they helped to reclassify security as a selective good, surreptitiously or 
explicitly proposing a notion of citizenship that excluded a significant 
share of its real citizens, i.e. the poor, the homeless, drug addicts, 
prostitutes, and migrants, whose citizenship rights were effectively 
reduced and who were thus disempowered. In this phase, the Milan case 
seemed to be coherent with a neo-liberal interpretation of the recent 
transformations in urban governance on a global scale, particularly in 
terms of the proliferation of local regulations and policies targeting the 
poor and the informal economy, the strengthening of the role of the 
police in maintaining order, and the re-emergence of a racialised 
discourse about the poor that is closely connected to their 
criminalization.7 The only aspect that does not fit this interpretation is 
the strengthening of the role of public institutions traditionally 
operating in the field of security and the virtual absence of any form of 
deregulation. 
On the contrary, the dual process of the “urbanisation” of security and 
the “securitisation” of urban governance has led to new forms of 
                                                 
6 See :  
http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2011/04/27/news/rom_de_corato_festeggia_i_cinq
uecento_sgomberi-15419177/  
7 See Amster, 2003; Caldeira, 2000; Herbert and Brown, 2006; Robins, 2002; 
Samara, 2010; Wacquant, 2009. 
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cooperation - as well as new opportunities for friction - (Pavarini 2006) 
between public authorities operating at the central and local levels. For 
example, the Minister of Home Affairs established in a special decree 
(5 August 2008) that urban security should be understood as “a public 
good to be protected through activities in local communities aimed at 
fostering compliance with the norms governing civil life, in order to 
improve living conditions in urban centres, civil coexistence and social 
cohesion”- a definition consistent with the dominant public discourse 
(Selmini 2004), which potentially extends the scope of security to 
encompass every aspect of city government. 
Moreover, the growing importance given to the governance of urban 
security, and the consequent attribution of an increasingly important 
role to local governments in this specific policy field, have favoured a 
shift in decision-making powers from national to local authorities 
(Menichelli 2015).8 
On the one hand, city mayors, their coordination and representation 
bodies (the ANCI and the Italian Forum for Urban Security) and, in 
some cases, ad hoc coalitions (the Parma Charter), have put forward 
demands for greater autonomy in the security domain, for greater 
powers and more resources, as well as for greater involvement in the 
management of security and of the phenomenon of “urban degradation 
and disorder”. 
                                                 
8 Urbanization of security, together with the territorial reorganization of public 
powers and the emergence of the local/urban as the reference point for policies 
are perfectly in line with a broader trend of territorialisation that affected, in 
the same years, many areas of public intervention in Italy (Bifulco 2016) and 
that involved a rescaling of statehood (Brenner 2004; Gualini 2006), a 
reframing of public action in terms of resources, targets and actors (Governa 
and Salone 2004), as well as a cooperation between public authorities, third 
sector associations and private actors in both policies’ design and 
implementation. 
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On the other hand, the responsibilities and territorial distribution of 
powers in the field of public order and security management have 
gradually been redefined. In 2006, “Local Security Pacts” were agreed 
between the Ministry of Home Affairs and municipal administrations, 
with the aim of improving the involvement of local communities in the 
creation of urban policies through participatory forms of producing the 
public good. In the case of the province of Milan, the pacts were then 
converted into formal agreements between the prefetto and the local 
mayors aimed at strengthening cooperation between national police 
forces, local police, third sector associations and private individuals, 
through the promotion of projects aimed at increasing the sense of 
security in urban areas, improving the quality of life in the city, and 
encouraging civic participation (Colombo and Quassoli 2016).  
In 2008, following the adoption of the “Security Package” (Legislative 
Decree 92 of 23 May 2008), this process reached its final stage with an 
amendment to the law on local administration, which broadened the 
prerogatives of Italian mayors, authorising them, as government 
officials, to adopt “necessary and urgent” measures to prevent and 
address “serious dangers threatening public safety and urban security”.9 
In the 2000s the work of the Provincial Committees for Security and 
Public Order (established by Law 121/1981)10 gained more visibility 
and relevance. The Provincial Committees established themselves as an 
inter-institutional platform facilitating dialogue, coordination, and the 
                                                 
9 At the local level, the 2008 “Security Package” had a primarily symbolic 
objective, as the realization of a sort of securitarian devolution, with all the 
emphasis placed, in the political and public debate, on autonomy and on the 
role of local government (Marchetti and Molteni 2013, 54-56). 
10 Participation in the committee has also been extended to include mayors of 
non-capital cities whenever matters relating to the territories they govern are 
discussed. 
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circulation of information and knowledge between all actors with jobs 
and responsibilities in the field of security within a given area. 
II. Urban governance, discourses and security practices 
in Milan 
In light of what has been outlined above, we shall now turn to the salient 
elements of security governance in Milan that emerged from the 
fieldwork, with particular reference to the construction of a shared 
security framework, the relationships between institutional actors 
operating in the field of security, and the dispositifs that were put into 
place.  
2.1. Security: Different nuances, shared premises 
A key issue, which relates to the processes of securitisation discussed 
in the first part and which emerges clearly from the analysis of the 
interviews, concerns the scope of the application of the concept of 
security and the degree of consensus over its definition among actors 
participating in the committee. Two remarks can be made in this regard. 
1) Each actor tends to propose a definition of security that is consistent 
with the functions that the institution they represent is supposed to 
perform: there is a shift from a “restricted” notion of security which 
focuses on activities of a preventive and repressive nature conducted by 
the national police force - advanced by those who have a “technical” 
role – to a broader notion of security - held by managers and officials 
of the municipal police (as well as by some administrators) - which 
includes aspects related to the degradation of neighbourhoods, to a 
diverse range of deviant behaviour, to the quality of life in the city and, 
in one case, to a purely political stance that conceives of security in 
terms which suggest an ideal of good city governance. 
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“The concept of urban security is very broad and not always well-
defined, and it affects all aspects of society. When we talk about urban 
security, we refer to the problem of the suburbs, where there are no 
efficient services, all the way down to security connected to large- and 
small-scale crime.” (Head of Cabinet, Local Police of Milan) 
 
“In a general sense, security is to ensure peace in the city (...). A city is 
safe when there is no crime, no degradation, when the city is a 
“paradise”. It is clear that this isn't the case in Milan, the larger the city, 
the harder or more unattainable the dream of having a safe city is.” 
(Chairman of the Committee on Security and Social Cohesion) 
 
Local governments now commonly invoke security concerns, with 
some paradoxical effects. On the one hand, politicians and 
administrators seem to have aligned with many sociologists and 
criminologists in criticising the notion of security as being confined to 
the criminal and the deviant. As many analysts have stated (Bauman 
1997; Palidda 2016; Stefanizzi 2014), the concept of security should be 
understood in a multidimensional way, and security issues should 
encompass social issues. In this sense, the institutional actors’ frame of 
reference is quite different from that which characterised the seventeen 
years of the centre-right administrations (1993-2011). On the other 
hand, however, with an increase in the number of issues falling under 
the umbrella of security (including the constant change in the socio-
demographic composition of the population, the transformations 
undergone by the economic and productive fabric of the city, the 
conflicts between different groups that compete for the use of public 
space), the process of securitisation gains momentum (Balzacq 2010). 
“For sure one of the most difficult issues is that of small-scale crime, 
even if the numbers are down; it is a crime that affects people personally 
(...) Another aspect of degradation is noise and civil coexistence, as the 
nightlife in Milan has expanded, leading to the presence of drunken 
2018/12 
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youths and numerous acts of vandalism throughout the year.  Another 
pressing problem in the Milan area is begging, which has been 
addressed by introducing a policy that provides for an increase in the 
number of shelters. We have also closed down several Roma camps.” 
(Municipal councillor for security of the City of Milan) 
“Milan has some security problems which are typical of metropolitan 
areas, the problems have increased over time and involve the 
redevelopment and renewal of peripheral areas that appear less 
privileged, of neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Milan which demand 
their fair share of attention, this is a common theme in all great 
metropolitan areas.” (Provincial commander of the Carabinieri)  
A heterogeneous set of phenomena are, therefore, redefined as 
generalised forms of risk, thus reinforcing what Rose described as “risk 
thinking” (2000, 332), a line of thought which is increasingly 
widespread in Western societies.11 
“Never underestimate anything, this is the right approach. You must be 
aware of everything and not overlook situations that may be irrelevant 
at the time but that may escalate.  A Prefect needs to be able to identify 
a problem before it turns into one: signs of potential escalation, so as to 
act on the risk, not the danger. Anticipating risky situations and carrying 
out prevention activities to avoid them escalating into a public order 
emergency”. (Prefect of Milan)  
Narratives of this kind tend to feed a real “security frustration” (Castel 
2003) and contribute to creating a generalised anxiety about “security”, 
a term that ends up encompassing a wide and varied combination of 
urban problems and governance practices. 
                                                 
11 On risk as a cultural category see Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; on 
social/securitarian dialectics see Bigo 2006; 4-59; on fear as a central element 
of political debate and government action see Furedi 2008; Simon 2007. 
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2) According to our respondents, the distinction between objective and 
perceived security is crucial and is used to qualify the securitisation 
process. In a city like Milan, which all respondents depict as very safe 
compared to other large European cities, local administrators seek to 
improve the perception of security even where real security (understood 
as the likelihood of being subjected to a crime) cannot possibly be 
increased. 
“Certain types of crime have decreased, while predatory crime, 
which bothers people most, is a bit on the increase. The reason 
behind robberies and looting is linked to the economic crisis. I 
believe that in recent years safety has neither increased nor 
diminished, despite the opposition trying to paint the city of Milan 
as the Wild West. (...) Then, but this is well known, it is necessary 
to distinguish between real and perceived safety, which is equally 
important. Especially for those in government, the problem that 
must be tackled is also to ensure perceived safety, i.e. the one 
citizens regard more subjectively, rather than objectively.” 
(Chairman of the Committee on Security and Social Cohesion)  
Although statistical data indicate a steady and gradual decline in crime, 
citizens’ perception of high insecurity - which is taken as a fact - is 
traced back to the urban and social transformations that have 
characterized Milan in recent decades, and is invoked to legitimise 
heavy-handed and extensive interventions by city administrations 
aimed at ensuring urban security. 
Let us consider, for example, the growing spread of the concept of 
“participatory security”, which entails the active involvement of 
citizens in the activities of protecting the local area and which is at the 
heart of the project “Neighbourhood Watch Officers” (vigili di 
quartiere), promoted by the centre-left municipal administration and 
2018/12 
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officially launched on 3rd April, 2012.12 Each of the 84 city districts 
were assigned four neighbourhood watch officers who are deployed at 
the gates of primary schools, in markets, at neighbourhood events and 
at crossroads, under the supervision of local officials and assisted by 
police patrols. They travel by bicycle, are in contact with a coordination 
centre that can be reached by phone or internet by anyone, and are 
trained to establish dialogue with citizens in order to become familiar 
with the daily problems of the city and take timely action to resolve 
them. The intervention model on which the project was based is 
characterised as “proactive”, that is, “centred on knowledge of the area 
and on interaction with the inhabitants”. In the official website of the 
project, the “mission” of the neighbourhood watch officers was defined 
as follows: “A figure who ‘cares for’ the neighbourhood and who 
specialises in ‘urban well-being’, which is not simply about enforcing 
the rules, but also about sharing critical issues and seeking solutions for 
a safe and supportive community. For a participatory urban security 
practiced in everyday life ‘together’ with the citizenry. For active 
listening aimed at obtaining credibility, as well as the trust of those 
living in the neighbourhood”. 
The main goal of the project is to bring the institutions closer to the 
citizens, in order to better understand their needs and to identify, with 
the active participation of stakeholders, the most appropriate shared 
solutions. The administration regards the project’s implementation as a 
turning point in public security policies, because officers no longer 
perform only the administrative functions of the municipal police, but 
are now called upon to contribute to decreasing levels of perceived 
insecurity. In the discourse of our interviewees, “citizens” are seen as 
being some of the main agents in the production of security. A 
                                                 
12 For a description of the project see:  
http://www.comune.milano.it/wps/portal/ist/it/servizi/polizialocale/vigili_of_
the_neighborhoods  
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fundamental aspect of the cooperation between citizens and the police 
is the early identification of all factors that can contribute to increasing 
citizens’ (subjective) sense of insecurity. The key point thus becomes 
the constant monitoring of the demand for security by citizens who are 
discursively positioned as prosumers of security as a good. Their main 
duty is reporting, and it is through this activity that they contribute 
individually to reducing/limiting urban degradation. The model 
requires citizens to report everything that might pose a threat to the 
system, conceived of as “their own community”. Citizens’ participation 
can also be organised in the form of neighbourhood associations and 
committees working together to retain control of the area and to 
maintain public order. 
The explicit reference to the concept of community reinforces the idea 
of a homogeneous in-group, the “Milanesi”, who share certain values 
and a common belonging. The city (the territory), is qualified as “our 
own”. The “citizens” are given an active role in the production of 
security, which consists, in particular, in reporting to the police cases of 
urban degradation and “suspects”, i.e. people who pose a potential 
threat to security. In the discourse of the interviewees it is the 
community (“the citizenry”) who perceives these individuals as 
potentially dangerous, and the presence of the (undifferentiated) ‘Other’ 
comes to be seen “almost naturally” as a source of threat. 
2.2. Actors, inter-organisational relations, and instruments 
All of the interviewees stressed the quality of the collaboration 
established in Milan between the different institutions and police forces 
that participate in the committee meetings. 
“The Prefect plans the public security strategies throughout the 
province and has coordinating powers in matters of public safety over 
Prefects of the provinces which are part of the region. The Chief of 
Police, on the other hand, exercises authority in security matters but on 
2018/12 
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a technical level: he makes the most appropriate decisions to manage 
an event from a technical perspective.  The Prefect gives the basic 
guidelines on how to handle an event.” (Prefect of Milan)  
This collaboration foresees a division of labour between national and 
local police forces and the different institutional actors involved (Chief 
of Police, police commissioner, mayors), alongside specific forms of 
cooperation on particularly complex and relevant issues, which the 
committee regularly includes in the agenda. It also benefits from broad 
agreement on the priorities and forms of intervention aimed at ensuring 
the safety of the city. It hinges around methods for controlling each 
urban area and the people who live in it and/or use it. 
“Following the appointment of the new Prefect in August 2013, we 
have enlarged and reviewed the Committee on Public Safety turning it 
into a body that meets every week and in which the municipality 
participates regularly, not only when invited by the Prefect as before. 
Inside the committee there is greater sharing of strategies, tasks and 
objectives and this collaboration between local police and law 
enforcement agencies has allowed us to review progress on strategic 
situations and to have common lines of approach.” (Municipal 
Councillor for Security)  
The city territory is divided into different areas: nine for the local police, 
corresponding to the administrative decentralised zones of the 
municipality; and four for the carabinieri and the state police (with the 
latter having a greater presence). This creates a spatial distribution of 
resources aimed at making control total, the presence of law 
enforcement visible, the allocation of resources optimal, and the 
coordination work between forces efficient.13 
                                                 
13 The subdivision of the territory, however, does not fully correspond to a 
decentralisation of functions, given that some, in particular those of the 
coordination of the patrols of rapid intervention entrusted to the operative 
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A very sensitive aspect of the relationship between state police and local 
police concerns the latter’s prerogatives. Broadly speaking, the tasks 
undertaken by the local police are not only those competences attributed 
to them by law but also those acquired on the ground during the fight 
against crime. Over the past two decades, the local police have formed 
specialist investigation teams that have earned them growing 
appreciation by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in a series of 
investigations into serious criminal phenomena. The greater 
prominence given to this area in the first decade of the 21st Century, 
however, has been to the detriment of other equally important functions 
that were traditionally the prerogative of the local police, such as 
consumer protection, worker safety, illegal trade and construction, and 
environmental crimes (Palidda 2016). With the change in 
administration in 2011, this transformation has suffered a setback and 
today the Milanese local police seem more focused on improving their 
specific skills in the domain of transport policing (in urban areas) and 
in administrative policing. However, in our interviews with officials 
there was a clear desire to continue to also work in the fight against 
crime by virtue of a presumed greater knowledge of the territory, 
acquired thanks to the constant dialogue with citizens. 
“The local police do exactly what it's supposed to do under the rules 
and codes, and therefore it has a wide remit: we are directly responsible 
for administrative and traffic police duties. There are differences 
between the tasks of the Local Police, the Judicial police and the 
carabinieri, but let's say, it's not so much a legal issue as a question of 
competence and trust between us and the local administration. As a rule 
we deal with small-scale crime, while for large-scale crime and more 
specific issues that require certain skills, the exclusive action of other 
law enforcement agencies is requested. (...) today the Local Police is 
                                                 
centres, remain centralised (or have been re-centralised in recent years, as in 
the case of the local police in Milan), which is also due to the potential and 
efficiency of the electronic technologies employed. 
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used to solve problems that were previously assigned to the police and 
the carabinieri.” (Head of Cabinet, Local Police of Milan)  
The local police have been particularly eager to take on this new role in 
relation to operations characterised by high public and media visibility, 
such as major operations to combat crime in some districts, large events, 
street demonstrations, evictions, etc. These operations have led to the 
establishment of thematic working groups, convened ad hoc on the 
occasion of particular events, as well as territorial working groups for 
coordination between forces, which reproduce, in areas of 
administrative decentralisation and at an immediately operational level, 
the collaborative methods practiced at the provincial (now 
metropolitan) level by the Provincial Committee for Order and Public 
Security. 
“At the behest of Chief of Police (...) for about two years now, every 
month, at our station we have been calling a so-called multi-police 
meeting, to tackle problems that are a bit more complex than ordinary 
ones. It is attended by the local police and the various heads of the area's 
police stations, the Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza. At this 
meeting, which usually takes place once a month, we discuss certain, 
somewhat more serious issues (...). There have also been several 
occasions when, in order to deal with specific problems, similar 
meetings have been set up, other than the monthly multi-police 
coordination meetings, which involve the Councillor, the citizens' 
committees and representatives of law enforcement agencies in the 
area, just to understand and agree on the necessary measures to solve a 
problem.” (Local Police - area 8 Station)  
Action in the field of security is embodied in some dispositifs which, 
according to Foucault (1977), are to be understood as systems of 
relations between heterogeneous objects (discourses, practices, 
artefacts, texts, standards, institutions, administrative measures, 
quantifications, etc.) which reflect a political urgency or an emergency 
  LIEPP Working Paper n° 83 
19 
 
and constitute the space within which a discourse acquires meaning and 
produces effects. One of these effects is to give visibility to particular 
objects, places, situations, behaviours and social groups, in order to 
control, regulate and govern them (Rabinow 2003). We can identify 
three fundamental dispositifs for the control of the territory of Milan 
which allow the collection, quantifying, mapping, distribution and 
making visible of events for which priorities and plans are subsequently 
defined - ordinances, video surveillance, and risk maps. 
As far as ordinances are concerned, which were the main instrument of 
Milan’s political and administrative governance in the domain of urban 
security in the first decade of the 2000s, it is apparent that the Pisapia 
administration (2011-2016) marked a strong discontinuity with the past. 
In fact, the use of ordinances was greatly reduced, avoiding the bending 
of extraordinary measures to everyday tasks and limiting their use to 
situations characterised by urgency, unpredictability and temporariness. 
Strong continuity, however, has emerged with regard to the massive and 
widespread use of video surveillance activities, which did not decrease 
with the establishment of the centre-left administration. Not only has 
the number of cameras increased, but video surveillance has maintained 
a central place in public discourse about security governance in the city. 
“The number of CCTV cameras has grown substantially and they 
perform the function of increasing perceived safety, though they are no 
deterrant.” (Chairman of Committee on Security and Social Cohesion) 
In the answers of our interviewees, security cameras - with their 
visibility and materiality - seem to have a primarily communicative 
function, that of reassuring citizens, responding to their anxieties of 
security and their supposed perception of insecurity. In more general 
terms, however, the use of cameras - the choice of where and how to 
place them and direct them according to events and occasions - is an 
expression of governmental rationality.  
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“Another very important element is the cameras, we have about 1,700 
cameras in the city connected with our operation units, we have defined 
a protocol with the prefecture and with all law enforcement agencies 
and we have connected the system so that our cameras are viewed and 
can be operated simultaneously by all law enforcement agencies and 
the prefecture. This means that it is a system everyone can benefit from, 
and, in fact, it has improved the effectiveness of our work. These 
cameras do not work as early warning signals but are critical to 
investigate crimes and because citizens just need to see the cameras and 
they somehow feel more secure and protected by the institutions.” 
(Municipal Councillor for Security)  
The cameras do not only perform the communicative function of 
reassuring citizens, or serve only as tools for investigation, repression 
and punishment through ensuring the identification of those who 
commit acts that are deemed unlawful. The strategies that support and 
justify their use, in fact, are based on processes and mechanisms of 
classification that guide and organise the collection and management of 
information (Cole 2001; Harcourt 2007; Simon 2007), helping to 
identify specific social groups and situations to be subjected to 
particular control regardless of their actual behaviour, as well as to 
define, in every place in the city and in every situation in urban life, 
“who should be present, where and when, who is ‘out of place’ and who 
it is appropriate to see” (Lyon 2007, 94).  
Another instrument at the disposal of the police forces, which is widely 
used in the planning of security governance in the city, are “risk maps”, 
a sort of representation of criminal life in Milan which, through the 
analysis and visualisation of georeferenced data, detects criminal hot-
spots and subdivides the territory on the basis of the presumed 
dangerousness of an equally presumed greater risk, whether general or 
specific (relative, that is, to a particular type of crime). The sharing of 
the recorded data and the analyses carried out, presented in the meetings 
of the provincial committee, end up constituting the technical artifacts 
  LIEPP Working Paper n° 83 
21 
 
whereby decisions on the protection of urban security are made and 
through which preventive police interventions on the ground are 
planned. 
“We have our own, formalized risk map, we have analyzed a series of 
filtered data in very specific contexts in order to get, as a local Police, 
a clear picture of the Milan area which can provide useful guidance for 
immediate action by the police forces. It is constantly updated on the 
basis of our information. Through the use of data, images and video a 
specific situation can take shape and this allows us to divide the city 
into sectors so as to position the various law enforcement agencies 
based on their specific responsibilities. Once a problem has been 
identified, the effort of the police forces is intensified and, after a short 
time, we can determine whether the problem has been dealt with 
positively. This, in all cases, has proven to be highly effective, from 
dealing with urban security, to managing Roma camps, in (facing) 
conflicts and tensions.” (Head of cabinet, Local police of Milan)  
In general, these risk assessment tools are based on situational 
prevention models, depend on the ability to collect and act upon 
information analysed with actuarial instruments, and are aimed at the 
examination and probabilistic identification of criminal behaviours and 
places with the highest risk of victimisation (Braga and Bond 2008; 
National Institute of Justice 2005; Yang 2010). These technological 
tools make clear how the actuarial approach (Harcourt 2007) based on 
the notion of risk has become crucial in the governance of cities and 
constitutes “an effort to depoliticise public issues, to suggest technical 
solutions to often complex phenomena” (Borraz and Le Galès 2010, 
26). Finally, it is evident how the attribution of risk profiles - in other 
words, different levels of criminal probability - to subjects and social 
groups (Castel 1991; Rabinow 2007; Rose 2007) through the use of 
technologies and instruments geared towards the identification, 
classification and governing of individuals, groups, situations and 
places means obliterating any consideration of the social causes of 
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crime and ends up reinforcing negative stereotypes about particular 
social groups and urban areas. 
III. Expo 2015 
In the course of this research, safety management for the Universal 
Exposition, which was held in Milan in 2015, has repeatedly emerged 
as a major issue.  
The organisation of the security system for Expo 2015 - which was on 
the agenda of the meetings of the provincial committee over several 
months - was long and complex, and was based on an attempt to carry 
out “total planning” - as it was defined by the provincial commander of 
the carabinieri - that would not overlook any possible risk. 
Expo played an important role in the reorganisation of the system and 
forms of security governance in the Milan metropolitan area in at least 
three ways: first, the planning and transformations of the concepts, 
organisational forms and instruments of security governance in the 
territory; secondly, the resulting long-term transformations; thirdly, the 
practical consequences and impact on the local security system. In this 
context, we would particularly like to make a few remarks on the first 
aspect. As explained by the Milan Chief of Police, the thematic working 
groups tasked to implement the safety management system at Expo 
2015 under his coordination in the months preceding the Expo, 
prepared, imagined and examined, “all possible critical scenarios and 
management strategies to address them”. On that occasion, “possible” 
scenarios were projected on the basis of experience gained in local 
security governance, comparison with the experience of other countries 
in managing major events, and the specific local situation. 
For the London Olympics in 2012, the Rand Corporation developed a 
model for planning security systems that is particularly relevant in this 
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respect. The model was based on projecting “all possible future 
scenarios” of security risk, on the assumption that, given the intrinsic 
indeterminacy of these future scenarios, the organisation of security 
“must be developed under conditions of great uncertainty”. The local 
authorities whom we interviewed who participated in the Provincial 
Committee for Security and Public Order said that they were also aware 
of the fact that “anything could happen” and that therefore absolute 
planning was impossible. What was needed, then, was the organisation 
of a system based on the ability to imagine anything that might happen 
- even without an accurate assessment of the probability of each 
scenario - and, at the same time, capable of taking action even when 
faced with the unpredictable. This represents a “style of thought” (Fleck 
1979; Rose 2007) based on an overabundant construction of scenarios 
and the unpredictability of threats to security, and marks a shift from a 
logic of prevention to a logic of precaution, in which “security risks 
proliferate and exceed the ability of authorities to fully manage them, 
or even to detect them, with the consequence that maintaining the 
appearance of absolute security becomes an urgent task” (Boyle and 
Haggerty 2009, 262). Indeed, the focus was on the development of 
“government technologies” (Rose and Miller 1992) capable of ensuring 
the objective of managing all those security problems that could not be 
predicted or prevented, and upon which it was essential, according to 
the Milan Chief of Police, to intervene quickly and decisively, avoiding 
any confusion of roles while ensuring effective decision-making and 
coordination. 
The organisation of the management of emergencies that could have 
undermined the safety of Expo 2015 (in the exhibition site, but also in 
the city in general) involved setting up two coordination centres: the 
Joint Operations Centre, a joint control body, and the Emergency 
Coordination Centre, an operations body tasked with coordinating the 
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interventions of all of the operators involved and with taking immediate 
action if needed. 
So Expo 2015 ended up becoming, in the words of the Chief of Police, 
a laboratory for experimenting with new approaches to urban security 
management. The types and means of cooperation between public 
actors and police forces involved in security management in the 
metropolitan city have consequences that extend “well beyond what 
occurs on the days of any individual happening. Mega-events foster a 
legacy of knowledge, networks and habits that have a bearing on the 
lives of considerably more individuals than those in attendance” (Boyle 
and Haggerty 2009, 265). Together with allowing for the setting up of 
new tools and for experimenting with different forms of joint 
coordination, Expo 2015 it has been a testing ground for new models of 
safety management. The emphasis placed on the ability to construct 
multiple scenarios - virtually all of those imaginable - that would enable 
a response to any threat, identified not so much in terms of their 
probability as in terms of their mere possibility, sustained the 
production of new instruments for the coordination and governance of 
urban security, based on the ability to intervene and manage, if not 
foresee and prevent, any situation of danger or disturbance to public 
order, even extremely unlikely ones. This desire for protection from the 
unpredictable obviously echoes with the fear that has gripped Western 
cities and societies since 9/11, and unveils the dream of an ideal city 
that, if it cannot be purified of every risk or threat, can at least be put 
perfectly under control. 
 
Concluding remarks 
We have tried to illustrate the most recent transformations in urban 
security policies in Milan, and their continuity/discontinuity with those 
  LIEPP Working Paper n° 83 
25 
 
adopted by previous administrations. The essential elements that 
emerge from our analysis on the evolution of the discourse and on the 
policies on security in Milan can be summarised as follows.  
Firstly, in line with what has happened in other large European cities 
over the last two decades, many of the major issues on the city’s 
governing agenda have been placed under the “semantic umbrella” of 
urban security. This has triggered the profound reconfiguration of a 
heterogeneous complex of practices, institutions and devices aimed at 
identifying and governing new forms of generalised risk, together with 
the redistribution of responsibilities among national and local 
institutions operating in the field of security. The increasing 
securitisation of urban life has also led to a shift - both in emphasis and 
resources - from a concept of city government focused on the need to 
address a range of social problems to one focused on situational 
prevention and the criminalisation of problems, conflicts and groups. 
If, on the one hand, the centre-left administrations in office since 2011 
have tried to distance themselves from what happened in the previous 
fifteen years - during which problems and policies traditionally 
understood from a social perspective were approached as security issues 
- on the other hand, securitisation remains a crucial framework for the 
government of the city. A double question could be raised concerning 
this point: the first and more immediate one is to which extent can we 
conceive the securitization of some core urban issues as an established 
crucial framework for city governance also in other European cities; the 
second one stems from the fact that if securitization constitutes a shared 
element between center-left and center-right coalitions, then the only 
distinctive elements of the center-left governments seem to be a 
definition of security that combine criminal and social issues, together 
with a greater capacity to provide a policy response, in terms of output, 
effectiveness, and ability to manage the relationships between central 
and local public institutions. 
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Secondly, the dominant public discourse on security has definitely 
embraced the distinction between objective risks and subjective 
perception, in order both to promote local government as the main 
political-institutional actor that must take charge of citizens’ sense of 
insecurity, and to strengthen the powers of (national and local) police 
forces against the (objective and/or perceived) threats that endanger 
public security in urban contexts. Moreover, the emergence of a risk 
thinking mindset, together with the importance attached to the 
perception of insecurity and the involvement of citizens in practices of 
a governmental nature (McIlvenny, Zhukova Klausen and Bang 
Lindegaard 2016), continues to entail the serious risk of the selective 
exclusion of social groups which are seen as problematic. If during the 
centre-right governments, for example, the issue of the presence of 
foreign people was directly and explicitly presented as a threat to 
security, without any attempt to hide the racist undertones and the 
discriminatory effects of such a discourse, with the centre-left 
administrations the tone has become milder, although the presence in 
public spaces of individuals or groups considered as a problem by - and 
for - the citizenry continues to be associated with the perception of 
insecurity.14 
Thirdly, the traits that had marked the city’s governance in a neo-liberal 
sense in the previous fifteen years have diminished markedly. If, on the 
one hand, the direct and explicit criminalisation of marginal and 
“problematic” social groups has disappeared, on the other hand, the 
partial securitisation of urban governance has represented an 
opportunity to further revive the role of public institutions which, 
despite new forms of division of labour between local and national 
                                                 
14 The same applies to the presence of nomad camps, which are mostly 
identified as both an actual threat and a significant element in the growth of 
the perception of insecurity and the disturbance of order and decorum in the 
neighbourhoods where they are set up. 
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institutions, maintain a substantial monopoly in the field of urban 
security.15 
Finally, the shift from a logic of prediction to a logic of precaution that 
has become clear in the organization of security for EXPO 2015 has 
involved a blurring of the boundaries between policing, which concern 
public order and security in civil contexts, and a more military approach 
according to which: “if we cannot know with certainty, the prudent 
thing to do is to prepare for the worst” (Amoore and de Goede 2008, 
Bourne 2013). It is reasonable to imagine that such an approach, which 
has increasingly marked internal and external security policies in 
Western countries after 9/11, has become more and more relevant also 
at the level of urban policies in light of the terrorist attacks that hit some 
of the most important European cities over the last three years (Paris, 
Manchester, London, Nice, Berlin, Barcelona, to name only the most 
relevant), making even more blurred the boundaries between police 
functions and those performed by the army that is increasingly deployed 
in urban spaces.16 Furthermore, if global events/threats are both a lab 
and a turning point for a concerted security governance of the big cities 
and if do they stimulate an approach based on a logic of precaution we 
can ask to what extent the latter is reshaping also more ordinary security 
practices and arrangements in Europe. 
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